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Abstract: Traditional authentication and key establishment protocols utilize nonce parameters as a means for message
freshness, recent aliveness, and key derivation. Improving identity verification, increasing key space, or making secret
updates more complex through nonces are not goals. Generating random numbers as nonces and not making the most
out of them can be considered as a loss in resource stricken radio frequency identification (RFID) tags. By increasing
the shared secrets slightly, a new functionality for the nonces is introduced, which makes the authentication and key
establishment protocols of RFID systems more secure, in general. The proposed method contributes to the security of
communication channels by increasing the key space. Attaining better security, with just a slight increase in the shared
secrets and the already generated nonces, is beneficial compared to the existing costly, resource-demanding security
primitives.
Key words: Nonce, RFID, mutual authentication, key establishment, tag

1. Introduction
One of today’s popular trends is using ubiquitous computing to put multiple, diverse computational devices
and systems into communication simultaneously. Radio frequency identification (RFID) is becoming one of the
core technologies of ubiquitous systems as they are getting integrated into everyday objects. In addition to the
identification property of traditional barcodes, RFID systems provide authentication. Basically, RFID systems
consist of a database server, a reader, and a tag. The tag is the weakest point as the least resourceful component
residing out in the field.
This attracts adversaries, who usually exploit the weakest point to penetrate the systems. The same
powerful attacks that target computers are launched at the tags, as well. Therefore, the tags have to be equally
provisioned to resist attacks, just like computers. To prevent attacks, many security protocols [1,2] have been
devised. The protocols attempt to create a secure communication channel through an insecure environment by
encrypting the messages. For encryption, a key known by the principals only is needed.
Key establishment (derivation of a common key by the principals) and authentication are the building
blocks of creating secure communication channels. Authentication is simply verifying that the opposite peer
(principal) is really the one that it claims to be [3,4]. RFID authentication is usually coupled with key
establishment and shared secret updating. The established key is used to encrypt the rest of the exchanges.
However, in recent years, intruders have stepped up their clandestine activities of capturing keys [5]. Meanwhile,
the providers are trying to improve security against known [3] and newly formulated attacks [6]. To prevent
attacks on keys, hence exposing the exchanged information, pseudorandom numbers called nonces are generated
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[3,4]. The generation of pseudorandom numbers is not free of cost; it requires energy and hardware and it
consumes die area. Therefore, not using them to further reinforce authentication security can be a loss.
The lifetime and strength of today’s security algorithms depend mostly on the key length. Another
technique for prolonging the protocol lifetime is the increase of the key space by running the algorithm multiple
times as in 3DES, or by devising a new algorithm with a longer key length, as in the advanced encryption
standard (AES). Our proposed scheme however, increases the key space and provides varying keys in every
run by increasing nonce functionality through an increase in shared secrets. This contribution has a better
cost-performance ratio than a new protocol with a longer key length or running an algorithm many times.
In the rest of this paper, the general form and components of mutual authentication and key establishment
in RFID is described in Section 2. In Section 3, our proposed method is described and demonstrated in 3 cases.
Section 4 has an overall performance evaluation and security analysis of the cases, after the application of our
proposed method. In Section 5, we conclude.
2. Authentication protocols using symmetric keys
The general form of a mutual authentication and key establishment process is shown in Figure 1. The initiator
‘A’ starts the exchange by sending its first set of parameters to challenge responder ‘B’ and negotiates the
algorithms that will be used (if not predecided). In the second step, B answers by sending its own parameters
and calculated authenticator. Hence, B tries to prove to A that it is alive, is really B, and agrees on the
algorithms that will be used. In the third step, A verifies its own identity and presence. At the end, A and
B are mutually authenticated. Usually, there is no fourth step, but some protocols have one to synchronize
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Figure 1. Authentication and key establishment in general.
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updating. As can be observed, after the initial exchanges, the principals perform calculations to verify that
the opposite has the preshared secrets and to reach a common key. If the same key is used by both sides, the
protocol is said to be symmetric, leading to the terms ‘symmetric key’ and ‘symmetric encryption’. Symmetric
key encryption is widely used in RFID technology.
The principals have one or many preshared secrets and a function for encrypting or hashing the authenticators [4]. Preshared secrets can be fixed or variable size, lasered into the integrated circuit [7], which never
leave the execution core, or biometric values that specifically belong to a person [8]. All of these features are an
effort to ensure the confidentiality of the information passed. Unfortunately, apart from decryption, tampering,
and side channel attacks, analysis of electromagnetic radiation and power traces are also used for exposing the
encryption key. The adversaries try to exploit any weakness to capture the exchanged information [9].
Many weaknesses have been demonstrated in protocols like short key length, an inadequate number of
inputs, limited complexity, and flawed equations. Weaknesses appear because sometimes the protocols are not
fully analyzed prior to their release. Nowadays, efforts are focused on discovering hidden weaknesses. An
example was given in [10], which used the same key throughout the lifetime of the device with no strategy of
changing it. This property encourages brute force attacks [3]. Improvements are offered, but sometimes they
cost energy, memory space, and computations that overwhelm RFID tags [10]. Our effort, however, increases
keys at the cost of little extra memory.
3. Increasing the key space
Nonces are generated for proving message freshness, recent aliveness, and key derivation, and as the input to
the hash or encryption of information (Figure 1). In key derivation, the participation of both principals’ nonces
is advised [3,4]. Our proposed scheme, shown in Figure 2, obeys this recommendation. The least significant
bits (LSBs) of the nonces and the XORed nonces are used to obtain a pointer (p(N a ) , p(N b ) , p(N a ⊕ N b ))
to one of the preshared secrets. Randomly pointed secrets are used as inputs or keys to encryption/hashing
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Figure 2. Proposed authentication primitives.
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functions, making authentication unpredictable to outsiders. In summary, our proposal increases key space by
increasing shared secrets. Our proposal can be applied to most symmetric key RFID authentication protocols.
Three different protocols have been chosen to demonstrate the application of our proposal. First, a protocol
using a constant key is studied. The second is a 2-step protocol that uses no nonces but only encryption. The
third is a recently attacked protocol.

3.1. Case 1: a protocol using nonces and a hash function
The work in [11] is a recent RFID authentication protocol utilizing a hash function, given in Figure 3. The
protocol is intended for ultra-light, low-cost tags, but the work in [12] put it in the light category due to the
hash function and the nonce generator. The nonces are represented as N 1 and N 2 . The most important
property is the use of the same secret key k and its hash value in all of the tags, which is attacked by the
work in [13]. Tracking, impersonation, and denial of service (DoS) attacks are demonstrated, based on a h(k)
value compromised by tampering with any tag. However, we demonstrate another attack below, where h(k) is
compromised without the need for physical tampering. The protocol is then made resistant to the described
attacks using our proposal.
A: Reader

[k,h(k),xi,yi,yiold]
Generates N1

B : Tag

[h(k),xi,yi]
Step 1:

N1

N2,M1,M2

Step 2:

Generates N2 , calculates: M1 = xi ⊕ h(h(k) ⊕ N2)
M2 = h(yi ⊕ N1 ⊕ N2)

Calculates:
xi = M1 ⊕ h(h(k) ⊕ N2), yi = fk(xi)
Verifies M2, calculates :
xi* = h(xi ⊕ yi ⊕ N1 ⊕ N2), yi* = fk(xi*)
M3 = yi* ⊕ h(xi* ⊕ yi), M4 = h(xi* ⊕ yi*)
yi , yi
yi *
yiold
Step 3:
N1 ,N2

xi,yi
k
h(k)

yiold

Notation
: Nonce of reader, nonce of tag
: Shared secret variables
: Secret key
: Hash of secret key k
: Old value of yi

M3,M4

Calculates : xi* = h(xi ⊕ yi ⊕ N1 ⊕ N2),
yi* = M3 ⊕ h(xi* ⊕ yi)
xi*, yi
Verifies M4, calculates: xi

yi*

Figure 3. Protocol with the same secret key k for all tags [11].

The attack is launched by sending nonce N 1 to the tag, waiting for the tag’s response, and then blocking
the reader’s messages, M 3 and M 4 . This can be repeated unlimited times because the tag answers every
challenge. Many nonces and related M x1 , M y2 pairs are recorded, where x and y denote the repetition number.
XORing 2 repeated M 1 messages gives M x1 ⊕ M y1 = h(h(k) ⊕ N x2 )⊕ h(h(k) ⊕ N y2 ) . Simply denoting h(k) as a
constant z, since it is so, we have numerous Q = h(z ⊕ N x2 )⊕ h(z ⊕ N y2 )-type equations. The Q, N x2 , and N y2
values are known and z is the only unknown. It is only a brute force attack to find a value for z that satisfies
y
∼ N y or N x ∼
the equations, which becomes trivial for N x2 =
2 = NOT(N 2 ) pairs, as Q tends to be zero or all ones
2
in these cases.
The same argument is true for message M 2 , where y i can be similarly deduced. Having exposed h(k), x i
can be calculated from M 1 . We will stop short of claiming the capture of secret k, assuming that the one-way
function in y i = f k (x i ) is truly resistant to brute force attacks. Otherwise, a full disclosure attack is possible.
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3.1.1. The proposed changes
The application of our proposed method for the same protocol is shown in Figure 4. There are 2 new security
primitives. First is the manufacturer’s lasered, unique ID (or S/N) that resists tampering and never leaves the
execution core. Second is a systematic scheme of creating pointers from nonces and randomly selecting one of
the available secrets. The LSBs of both nonces N 1 and N 2 are used to form pointers (Eqs. (1), (2), and (3) of
Figure 2) that help to choose 3 secrets from the sets {p 0 , p 1 , ..., p n } , {R 0 , R 1 , ..., R n } , and {Q 0 , Q 1 , ...,
Q n } , and a key from {k 0 , k 1 , ..., k n } . The number of LSBs used depends on n, e.g., for 8 secrets, 3 LSBs
are used. Both nonces are used to choose p x , k N 1 ⊕ N 2 , and R N 1 ⊕ N 2 to prevent an adversary from sending
the same nonce and forcing the use of the same keys or secrets. The unique ID of the tag is rotated left by an
amount of (p x ⊕ N 2 ) mod 16, since the word length (L) of an EPCglobal class-1 generation-2 standard tag is
16 bits. The obtained values P N 1 , N 2 , and k N 1 ⊕ N 2 improve M 1 and M 2 . Similar techniques are used in the
update of the parameters x i , M 3 , and M 4 .
A: Re a d e r

B : Ta g

Ge ne ra te s N1

N1

Ge ne ra te s N2 , ca lcula te s :
M 1 = xi ⊕ h(h(kN1 ⊕ N2 ) ⊕ P N1,N2 ),
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N2 ,M1 ,M2
Ca lc u la te s : xi = M1 ⊕ h(h(k N1 ⊕ N2 ) ⊕ P N1,N2 ), yi = f k(xi)
Ve rifie s M 2 , the n ca lcula te s : xi* = h(xi ⊕ yi ⊕ R N1 ⊕ N2 ), yi* = f k(xi*)
M 3 = yi* ⊕ h(xi* ⊕ yi ⊕ R N1 ⊕ N2 ), M4 = h(xi* ⊕ yi*) ⊕ h(P N1,N2 ⊕ R N1 ⊕ N2 ),
yi , yi
yi*
yiold
M3 ,M4
Ca lcula te s : xi* = h(xi ⊕ yi ⊕ R N1 ⊕ N2 ),
yi* = M3 ⊕ h(xi* ⊕ yi ⊕ R N1 ⊕ N2 )
xi*, yi
Ve rifie s M 4 , ca lcula te s : xi
N1 ⊕ N2

N 1 ⊕ N2
p0
..
px
..
pn

N1

N1 ⊕ N2
k0
..
kN1 ⊕ N2
..
kn

yi*

R0
N2
..
R N1 ⊕ N2
..
Rn

Q0
Q N1
Q N2
..
Qn

P N1,N2 = RotL(ID,p x ⊕ N2 )

Figure 4. Proposed protocol in case 1.

Deducing h(k), x i , or y i from M 1 , M 2 , M 3 , and M 4 is no longer possible. Neither the attacks described
in [13] nor our above attack succeeds because of the presence of the terms P N 1 ,
and k N 1 ⊕ N 2 .

N2 ,

Q N1 , Q N2 , R N1 ⊕ N2 ,

3.2. Case 2: a protocol using no nonces, but only encryption
Feldhofer’s work in [14,15] has shown that AES is going to be feasible in RFID tags in the future. A protocol
using only AES-encrypted parameters was proposed in [10]. The protocol shown in Figure 5a uses 2 preshared
secrets k 1 and k 2 , a constant cryptographic secret key k, and a unique ID k . No nonces are used and a collision
detection protocol is assumed to singularize tag T out of many.
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Re a d e r

Ta g

E k(k1 ⊕ k2 )

Ve rify E k(k1 , k2 ) == E*k(k1 , k2 ), a bort if not;
Encrypt E k(k1 +k2 +IDk) a nd s e nd to Re a de r
E k(k1 ⊕ k2 ⊕ IDk)
Upda te k1 , k2 :
k1 ⊕ E k(k2 ⊕ k1 )
k1
De crypt E k(k1 +k2 +IDk) a nd obta in IDk.
k2 ⊕ E k(k2 ⊕ k1 )
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If IDk == IDk, upda te k1 , k2 :
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k1 ⊕ E k(k2 ⊕ k1 )
k2 ⊕ E k(k2 ⊕ k1 )
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(a)
Re a d e r

Ta g
N1 , E P (k1 ⊕ k2 )
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PN
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Q
..
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Ve rify E R (k1 ⊕ k2 ⊕ ID'),
k1
E S (k1 ⊕ N2 ⊕ IDk)
k2
E S (k2 ⊕ N1 ⊕ IDk)

N1 ⊕ N2 R 0 N1 ⊕ N2 ⊕ R
..
R
..
RN

S0
..
S
..
SN

(b)

Figure 5. a) Flawed protocol of the work in [10] in case 2, b) Our proposed alternative in case 2.

First, the update flaw in [10] is shown, where the shared secret k 1 is updated as k 1 = k 1 ⊕ E k (k 2 ⊕
k 1 ). Actually, E k (k 2 ⊕ k 1 ) equals E k (k 1 ⊕ k 2 ) of the first message. Naming it as X, (new)k 1 = k 1 ⊕ X and
(new)k 2 = k 2 ⊕ X. With the new k 1 and k 2 values in the next round, the first message E k (k 1 ⊕ k 2 ) becomes
E k (k 1 ⊕ X ⊕ k 2 ⊕ X). This updated message reduces to the same original value E k (k 1 ⊕ k 2 ).
In addition, a ‘nonceless’ protocol is vulnerable to known attacks like DoS, man-in-the-middle, and
exhaustion attacks. The works in [16,17] attacked the work in [10] and offered alternative protocols with
improvements. The authors in [17] claimed that the work in [10] has traceability and that the work in [16]
points out the danger of using a constant key, at all times, as in [10]. Both corrective works consist of 4 steps
and use nonces with other security primitives. The work in [17] improved the protocol, but it also used a
constant key. If the boundaries and padding of the concatenated secrets are not properly designed as described
in [18], the protocol suffers a traceability flaw, because the encrypted K pub (ID) of [17] is detectable. The work
in [16] offered better security with a scheme for changing the encryption key but lacked forward secrecy, as all
of the keys were sequentially dependent on the previous. Both protocols have the same weakness of using a
constant to XOR the first nonce sent to the tag. The work in [17] made 2 pseudorandom number generator
(PRNG), 7 AES, and 1 XOR operations. The work in [16] made 1 PRNG and 6 AES but 4 XOR operations.
Our method is applied to the work in [10] below and it is demonstrated that known weaknesses are removed
with little overhead.
3.2.1. The proposed changes
The insertion of multiple secrets with 2 nonces into the work in [10] is shown in Figure 5b. The principals have
4 sets of preshared secret keys. A pointer is generated using N 1 , as in Figure 2, to choose a key P (Figure
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5b). A variable key, instead of the previous constant key k, is used in E P (k 1 ⊕ k 2 ). Even with a repeated N 1 ,
E P (k 1 ⊕ k 2 ) produces a completely different result due to the strong avalanche effect of AES, on different k 1
and k 2 or p. With N 1 ⊕ N 2 , other keys Q, R, and S are chosen. In our proposal, the ID k of the tag is obscured
by ROTL(ID k ,P ⊕ Q), where ID k is rotated left by an amount of (P ⊕ Q) mod 16. Next, it is encrypted and
sent in E Q (k 1 ⊕ k 2 ⊕ ID’). After authenticating the tag, the reader updates k 1 and k 2 first. A third step is
necessary to inform the tag of the update and avoid desynchronization. Therefore, E R (k 1 ⊕ k 2 ⊕ ID’) is used.
The encryption key S is obtained using N 1 ⊕ N 2 ⊕ R. The updates go through AES operations E S (k 1 ⊕ N 2 ⊕
ID k ) and E S (k 2 ⊕ N 1 ⊕ ID k ) , ensuring new values. Our protocol takes 3 steps, 1 PRNG, 5 AES operations,
1 rotation, and 10 XOR operations, i.e. less computation than in [16,17].
3.3. Case 3: a protocol attacked recently
The third example is a protocol that claims to offer strong security at a low cost [19], using a hash function as
the only cryptographic primitive. Both the protocol and the presented security analysis were formally analyzed
in [20], using just a hash function with standard techniques yet claiming that strong security is refuted with
detailed demonstrations of replay, traceability, and desynchronization attacks. The contribution of our proposed
method would be clearly proven if it removes the vulnerabilities of the protocol and makes it resistant to the
attacks described in [20].
The proposed modifications are shown in Figure 6, as 3 sets of secrets and pointers to the secrets.
Using the XOR of both nonces nr and nt, 3 secrets are pointed at. One of these secrets is used to add an
authenticator h(ID, P nr ⊕ nt ) in the second step. P nr ⊕ nt is obtained by rotating secret p nr ⊕ nt by an amount
of (ID ⊕ nt) mod 16. The reader finds the tag in the database using h(ID). Using the nonces, the reader also
obtains P nr ⊕ nt and verifies the authenticator h(ID, P nr ⊕ nt ). Next, the reader updates its secrets and passes
2 messages, h(Q nr ⊕ nt ) and h(ID’, S nr ⊕ nt ), to the tag. The tag verifies the reader through h(Q nr ⊕ nt ) and is
now informed by h(ID’, S nr ⊕ nt ) that the reader’s update has finished. Finally, the tag updates to ID = h(ID’,
S nr ⊕ nt ) as well.
Reader
ID, ID', h(ID)

Tag
ID, S

nr

nt,h(ID),h(ID,Pnr ⊕ nt)

Obtain Pnr ⊕ nt,h(ID,Pnr ⊕ nt)

Find ID corresponding to h(ID)
Obtain Pnr ⊕ nt, Verify h(ID,Pnr ⊕ nt)
ID' = ID, ID = h(ID',Snr ⊕ nt), update h(ID)
Obtain h(Qnr ⊕ nt),h(ID', Snr ⊕ nt)
h(Qnr ⊕ nt),h(ID',Snr ⊕ nt)
nr ⊕ nt

p0

pnr ⊕ nt

nr ⊕ nt

q0

Verify h(Qnr ⊕ nt), Verify h(ID, Snr ⊕ nt),
ID = h(ID',Snr ⊕ nt), update h(ID), set S = 0
nr ⊕ nt
s0

qnr ⊕ nt

snr ⊕ nt

qn
sn
pn
Pnr ⊕ nt = RotL(pnr ⊕ nt, ID ⊕ nt) Qnr ⊕ nt = RotL(qnr ⊕ nt,ID ⊕ nr ⊕ nt) Snr ⊕ nt = RotL(snt,ID ⊕ nr)

Figure 6. Proposed modified protocol in case 3.

The first attack launched in [20] was possible because the challenge and response of [19] were not related.
Thus, an active attacker sends a nonce to the tag and gets a response that can be replayed later. In our improved
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version, however, the response depends on the challenge through the P nr ⊕ nt term of the authenticator h(ID,
P nr ⊕ nt ) , which depends on both nonces. Moreover, the reader can verify if the nonce nt has changed on the
way. Therefore, the modification of nt always results in a rejection of the tag’s response by the reader. Since
there is no S defined in the final step of our protocol, the learning and challenge phases of the traceability attack
described in [20] cannot be launched.
The desynchronization attack in [20], based on the modification of nr, cannot go by unnoticed in our
protocol. Any modification results in a mismatch with h(ID, P nr ⊕ nt ) at step 2. The S bit defined in [20] is
turned off at the end of the protocol, but still a mechanism is needed to test S in the next run. For preventing
desynchronization attacks, the steps and transitions of the exchanges must be monitored by both sides. To
achieve this goal, a tag with a rudimentary state machine is essential.
4. Performance evaluation and security analysis
The memory cost of our proposed method is shown in the Table, where the word length (L) is 16 bits. As an
example, assuming 4 sets of shared secrets and keys (shown as P, Q, R, and k previously), each with 4 members,
a total of 16 L or 32 bytes of memory is needed (line 2 of the Table). Two LSBs of the nonces are used. If each
secret is eligible to be used and rotated by L, a maximum of 4 4 × 16 different keys are possible. If AES-128 is
going to be used, 8 keys must be merged. Using the table in [21], the average time required for an exhaustive
key search is 5.4 × 10 18 years at 10 6 decryptions/µ s for a key length of 128 bits. In general, the time required
after applying our proposal is (no. of keys) × 5.4 × 10 18 years. Thus, our method is (4 4 × 16 – 1) / 8 × 5.4
× 10 18 years more resistant in case 2, which has a single key. On the other hand, the additional number of
operations for obtaining pointers from nonces is at most 6, e.g., XORing, ANDing, ORing, rotating, loading an
index pointer, and fetching a secret.
Table. Memory cost and performance.

No. of
LSBs (bits)
1
2
3
4

No. of set
members
2
4
8
16

Total memory
cost (L)
8
16
32
64

Memory cost in
(bytes)
16
32
64
128

No. of
keys
16 × 24
16 × 44
16 × 84
16 × 164

No. of
operations
6
6
6
6

Running the 3 original protocols studied through the authentication verification tool AVISPA [22] revealed
their weaknesses. However, the same tool shows no attacks for our modified protocols. The results can be reached
through the link in [23]. Those attacks that cannot be checked by the tools have been detailed below.
4.1. Prevention of replay and reflection attacks
The role of the nonces is to provide message freshness and recent aliveness to the challenges and responses of
an exchange [24], thus preventing replay and reflection attacks. Since nonces are added and not removed in our
proposal, the security in the 3 cases increases. Moreover, our scheme forces the principals to pick the correct
shared secret or key depending on the exchanged nonces; therefore, the security is further increased. Because
an authenticator is calculated with different terms in every run, an adversary cannot fool either principal by
simply replaying or reflecting a previously formed authenticator. This is a clear improvement in security.
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4.2. Prevention of DoS and desynchronization attacks
There is no way of preventing DoS attacks simply with nonces, since the tags are stateless. For example,
a tag will always reply to a challenge. Other complementary features like keeping counters or finite state
machines are needed for the tags. However, exhaustion attacks that force the principals to go into overwhelming
computations with repeated bogus challenges are resisted in our proposal, because a challenge is responded to
by an authenticator formed with correctly chosen preshared secrets. A false authenticator halts the exchange
and prevents exhaustive computations.
Desynchronization occurs when the tag and the reader are tricked into a state where they update their
preshared secrets into different values. The update occurs at the end of the protocol and has to be verified.
Omitting the verification of the update is the reason of the weakness. The reader should update first and inform
the tag by sending a message with the updated values, to guide the tag to also update. This will remove the
necessity of keeping old values on the tag. This is precisely the reason of the presence of a third step message
in our proposals, obtained from the updated values.

4.3. Prevention of man-in-the-middle attacks
This type of attack is very efficient if complemented by a tampering attack. An adversary who acquires all of
the shared secrets by physically tampering with the tag can intervene in the exchange and falsify a transaction
without cloning the tag. Therefore, we propose the use of a secret ID lasered into a tag, whose value is given to
the end user written on a paper by the manufacturer but never leaves the execution core. Rotating this unique
ID depending on the nonces makes it a variable in the authenticator. Thus, this type of attack is resisted.

4.4. Detection of integrity loss and key lifetime
Any authenticator–nonce mismatch is detected in our proposed method. Therefore, the integrity of the nonces
and the authenticators is guaranteed. Loss of exchange integrity is only possible if an attacker’s bogus nonces
perfectly match the chosen secrets, a far possibility.
The key’s life-time is an important property of the encryption and hashing functions of the authentication
process. Using the same key at all times in all devices is not desirable, as the compromise of the key means the
loss of all of the past communications. Therefore, short key lifetimes are desirable. This property is provided
in our proposal by the rotation and changing of the secrets and keys used in every run.

5. Conclusion
A new approach towards increasing the key space in RFID authentication and key establishment protocols
has been introduced. The approach reinforces protocols in general and does not cause vulnerabilities. The 3
examples have demonstrated that the new approach makes protocols more resistant to known attacks. Our
proposal is limited to deriving different keys and obtaining dynamic results. However, the idea can lead to other
security enhancements like changing the order of operations according to the nonces. Although our proposal
is straightforward and adds incremental security, it only costs a little extra memory space and 6 additional
operations. This can be considered a good price/performance tradeoff for resourceless tags. A slightly larger
memory and simple operations are less resourceful than the demanding security primitives of encryption and
hashing.
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